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THE MENS REA OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION
NOAH WEISBORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
This gathering is steeped in history. It is the hundredth birthday of
Whitney Harris, one of the last original prosecutors of the Nazi leaders
after World War II. We're commemorating Harris' remarkable life at the
2012 International Criminal Court at Ten Conference at the Whitney
Harris World Law Institute at Washington University Law School. Under
the leadership of Professor Leila Sadat, the Institute has played a
formative role in the contemporary international justice project. The St.
Louis conference also celebrates the tenth anniversary of the International
Criminal Court, which has become an important feature in international
affairs since its birth in 2002. The ICC is perhaps the most concrete
expression of the Nuremberg legacy. Two years ago, against most
expectations, the Assembly of States Parties agreed to incorporate the
definition and jurisdictional conditions of the crime of aggression into the
Rome Statute, thereby reviving the fourth and final Nuremberg crime.'
In a very real sense, the future is contained in the past. ICC Judge
Hans-Peter Kaul, in his St. Louis lecture memorializing his friend Whitney
Harris, described how Harris crossed the raucous hall2 at the adoption of
the Rome Statute in 1998 to shake his hand and solemnly congratulate
him. Without Germany's initiative, "the crime of aggression would not
* B.Sc. (McGill), B.S.W. (McGill), LL.B. (McGill), B.C.L. (McGill), M.S.W. (McGill), LL.M.
Program (Harv.), S.J.D. (Harv.), Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College
of Law. The author was an independent expert delegate on the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression and at the ICC Review Conference. The author would like to thank Jonathan Graham and
Robert Visca for their research and Marisol Floren for her assistance at the FlU College of Law
Library.
1. The Crime of Aggression, Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, R.C. Res. 6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Kampala Outcome].
2. Hans-Peter Kaul, Judge, Int'l Crim. Ct., Lecture in Honor of Whitney R. Harris Former
Nuremberg Prosecutor at The International Criminal Court at Ten Conference: The Nuremburg
Legacy and the International Criminal Court, at 3 (Nov. 11, 2012). Judge Kaul stated:
After the decisive vote on the Rome Statute, our founding treaty, there is some kind of
explosion, an enormous outpouring of emotions, of relief among those present, unparalleled
for such a conference: screams, stamping, exultation without end, tears ofjoy and relief; hard-
baked delegates and journalists who have frowningly watched the entire conference hug each
other in a state of euphoria.
Id.
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have been included in the treaty."3 Though the crime of aggression almost
collapsed the negotiations, Harris considered it essential. In an eleventh
hour compromise, jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was included
in the Rome Statute, but the crime's definition and jurisdictional
conditions were left to be established later. It took twelve more years of
intricate negotiations to build a consensus on the definition and
jurisdiction of the crime. 6 Kaul, head of the German diplomatic delegation
in Rome and a stalwart proponent of criminalizing aggression, later
became an ICC Judge and Vice President of the Court. He concluded his
lecture in St. Louis speaking directly to his departed friend: "Whitney ...
[y]ou have shown us that power built on contempt of international law and
aggression will not stand-we continue to hear you."7
It's likely that the crime of aggression will be reactivated in 2017 or
soon after.8 I've been asked to contribute to the conference and this special
symposium issue of the Washington University Global Studies Law
Review by imagining future directions of the Court. Certainly, with 2017
rapidly approaching, the time for vigorous imagination is upon us. The
Review Conference in Kampala gave us the bare skeleton of a crime and
left a great deal to the imagination. The subject of my contribution, in
honor of Whitney Harris, will be the mens rea of the crime of aggression.
As all criminal lawyers know, when it comes to substantive crimes, mens
rea issues are pivotal in determining responsibility and punishment. Mens
rea is, after all, a "safeguard for beliefs firmly embedded 'within .. . [the
criminal law's] traditions of individual liberty, responsibility and duty."' 9
3. Id at 4.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 161, 162 (2008).
6. See Stefan Barriga, Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime ofAggression, in CRIME OF
AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 5 (Stefan
Barriga & Claus Kre8 eds., 2012) (discussing the negotiations from 1998 to 2010).
7. Kaul, supra note 2, at 16.
8. See David Scheffer, Adoption of the Amendments on Aggression to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. BLOG (June 13, 2010, 11:14 AM), http:/
iccreview.asil.org/?p=174 (remarking that he "would be surprised if, by January 1, 2017, the 30-State
Party requirement will not have been met"); Hans-Peter Kaul, Is It Possible to Prevent or Punish
Future Aggressive War-Making?, FORUM FOR INT'L CRIM. & HUMAN. L. 1, 2 (2011) ("There is little
doubt that this treaty, the Rome Statute, will soon have an article 8bis and articles 15bis and 15ter
incorporating the crime of aggression."); William A. Schabas, An Assessment of Kampala: The Final
Blog, THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE: KAMPALA 2010 (June 17, 2010, 10:09 AM), http:/iccreview
conference.blogspot.com/2010/06/assessment-of-kampala-final-blog.html ("Although the amendment
requires thirty ratifications and a positive decision by the States parties, this should not pose a serious
problem, and both conditions should be fulfilled by 1 January 2017 or shortly thereafter.").
9. Kelly A. Swanson, Criminal Law: Mens Rea Alive and Well: Limiting Public Welfare
Offenses In Re C.R.M, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2002) (quoting U.S. v. Cordoba-
Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
MEAS REA OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Today, most people deem a defendant who lacks a culpable mental state
unworthy of punishment. 10
The starting point for this exploration of the mens rea of the crime of
aggression is its elements.'' The elements are an official ICC document
clarifying the culpable mental state that applies to each aspect of the
conduct, consequences, and circumstances constituting the crime.' 2 They
are meant to "assist the Court in the interpretation and application" of the
Rome Statute.13 According to Professor Roger Clark, the elements have
been "central to the way the Chambers have been going about their
tasks."14
Fortunately, I won't be the first scholar to brave the elements. The first,
and still the most intrepid, was Clark himself. As a diplomatic
representative for Samoa, he played a leading role in the drafting of the
elements. Clark later wrote a paper in 2001 about this exercise-he called
it an anthropology of treaty-making-which also amounted to an
elaboration on the work of the Preparatory Commission." His 2008
article, published in the New Zealand Yearbook of International Law,
examines the way the elements of crimes were employed by the judges in
the early jurisprudence of the ICC.16 In an article published just before the
ICC Review Conference, Clark writes about negotiating the elements of
the fledgling crime of aggression." This 2009 paper includes a revealing,
if brief, discussion of the mens rea of the crime.'8
Two other sources are foundational to this analysis of the mens rea of
the crime of aggression. In April 2009, as the work of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression ("SWGCA") was wrapping up, a small
cadre of legal experts and diplomats was invited to an informal retreat in
10. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1306, 1308 (2011)
(discussing how punishments are applied to crimes with varying mental states).
11. See generally Kampala Outcome, supra note 1.
12. See Elements of Crimes: General Introduction, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www2.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-ABOB-68E5F9082543/0/Element of CrimesEnglish.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2013).
13. Id. 1.
14. Though the Pre-Trial Chamber I has, at least in Clark's view, also departed from the structure
of the Statute and Elements in important ways. See Roger S. Clark, Elements of Crimes in Early
Confirmation Decisions ofPre-Trial Chambers ofthe International Criminal Court, 6 N.Z. Y.B. INT'L
L. 209, 210 (2008).
15. Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L. F. 291, 292 (2001).
16. Clark, supra note 14, at 210.
17. Roger S. Clark, Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, its Elements and
the Conditionsfor ICC Exercise ofJurisdiction Over It, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2009).
18. Id. at 1111-13.
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Montreux by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs to draft the
elements of the crime of aggression. Frances Angaddi, Greg French, and
James Potter, legal experts and diplomatic representatives from Australia,
contributed a chapter to the Crime of Aggression Library about this
meeting. 19 SWGCA Chair Christian Wenaweser and his team then based
their 2009 Chairman's Non-paper on the Elements of Crimes, the other
foundational source, on the work of the Montreux group.20 With only
minor changes, the elements of the crime of aggression conceptualized in
Montreux became the official elements adopted alongside the definition
and jurisdictional conditions of the crime at the 2010 Review Conference
in Kampala. 21 The work of Clark, Anggadi et al., and Chairman
Wenaweser are, therefore, my starting point.
II. BRAVING THE ELEMENTS
Articles 30 and 32 of the Rome Statute are part of the so-called
"general" part and, therefore, apply to all ICC crimes, 22 including the
newly defined crime of aggression. Article 30 pertains to the mental
elements of the ICC crimes as distinguished from the material elements.
The material element is equivalent to the actus reus in the common law,
and the mental element serves the function of the mens rea.23 Article 32
deals with mistakes of fact and law and is, therefore, also relevant when
establishing the mental element of the crime of aggression because these
defenses can negate the necessary mental element.24
The material elements of ICC crimes can be broken down into conduct,
consequences, and circumstances. These three terms are not defined in the
Statute.25 Clark, careful not to speak for the drafters, defines conduct as an
26
act or omission. Consequences, as Clark defines them, are the results of
19. Frances Anggadi, Greg French & James Potter, Negotiating the Elements of the Crime of
Aggression, in CRIME OF AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION 58, 58 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kre8 eds., 2012).
20. 2009 Montreux Draft Elements of Crimes, in CRIME OF AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 669, 669 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kre8
eds., 2012).
21. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 64.
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 30, 32, July 1, 2002, 21 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
23. Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime ofAggression: Is There an Answer to the International
Criminal Court's Dilemma?, 65 A.F.L. REv. 229, 258-59 (2010) (discussing the mental and material
elements of the crime of aggression using common law terminology of mens rea and actus reus).
24. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 32.
25. Clark, supra note 15, at 306.
26. Id.
MEAS REA OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
27
an act or omission. Overlap between these terms, and confusion, occurs
for people who take conduct to include causation and results. 28 The term
"circumstances" is the most difficult of the three aspects of the material
element of the crime to define. Clark points out that the problem of
defining "circumstances," or "attendant circumstances," is not unique to
the Rome Statute. 29 Legal scholars and the drafters of the Model Penal
Code in the United States have also wrestled with the distinction between
conduct and circumstances.o Clark takes some comfort in the fact that we
know a circumstance when we see it: "If I kill a living being, it is only
murder if the being is a human one." 31 This imperfect breakdown of the
material element is nonetheless important-it becomes the basis for the
mental element, or mens rea, of every ICC crime.
There are only two culpable mental states in the Rome Statute: intent
and knowledge.32 There is no mention in the statute of recklessness or
negligence. The mental states of intent and knowledge apply in different
ways to the material elements of conduct, consequences, and
circumstances. For the conduct element of a crime, the defendant has the
culpable mental state if he or she "means [i.e., intends] to engage in the
conduct." 33 For the consequence element, the defendant has the culpable
mental state if he or she "means to cause that consequence or is aware
[knows] that it will occur in the ordinary course of events."3 4 The culpable
mental state for the circumstance element is also knowledge. A defendant
who knows that a required circumstance exists, such as the existence of an
armed conflict for war crimes, has the culpable mental state for this
35
material element of the crime.
The elements of the crime of aggression, as contained in the Kampala
Outcome (Annex II) are reproduced below:
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of
aggression.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id.; see generally American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1962).
31. Clark, supra note 15, at 306.
32. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 30; Elements of Crimes, supra note 12, 2.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 30(2)(a).
34. Id. art. 30(2)(b).
35. Id. art. 30(3).
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2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of
the State which committed the act of aggression.
3. The act of aggression-the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations-was committed.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations.
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale,
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations.
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established such a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations. '
The first element sets out the culpable conduct of the crime of
aggression. As a material element that concerns conduct, the culpable
mental state is intention: "[t]hose who open books and sit down in easy
chairs generally intend to read. . . . Certain acts require and entail having
certain mental functions." 37 The defendant must mean to (in other words,
have the purpose to) plan, prepare, initiate, or execute an act of aggression.
Planning, preparing, initiating, or executing is to the crime of aggression
what pulling the trigger of a gun is to murder. Both are conduct that results
in harmful consequences. A suggestion to have separate elements for each
conduct verb was rejected by the majority of experts at Montreux as being
unnecessarily complicated.3 8 The experts also considered the issue of
causation, or to what degree the defendant's intentional planning,
preparation, initiation, or execution must have caused the act of aggression
in relation to other factors and participants in the act.39 The group
ultimately noted that the causation issue should be determined by the
judges hearing a particular case.40 Under this element, the defendant does
not need to have the specific purpose to commit an act contrary to the UN
36. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21.
37. Adam Candeub, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2071, 2101 (1994).
38. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 65.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Charter. In fact, nowhere in any of the elements or in the definition of
aggression itself is there a requirement that the perpetrator intend to
violate the UN Charter.4 1 Element 4 and the special introduction to the
elements of the crime of aggression address this subtle and potentially
problematic issue more directly.
The second element sets out the leadership requirement. The crime of
aggression can only be committed by a person "in a position [to
effectively] exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State."42 Followers cannot commit the crime. This is a material
element that sets out an attendant circumstance that must be present for an
act to be properly classified as a crime of aggression. Consequently, the
defendant must know that he or she is a leader of a state, and is in a
position to effectively exercise control (not merely formally, like a
figurehead), or to direct the political or military action of a state.43 A
charismatic religious leader who has effective control over political action
of a state (e.g., the state bureaucracy follows his edicts) but is not aware of
the extent of his influence cannot, consequently, commit the crime of
aggression. He does not have the mens rea required in the second element.
More than one leader-an entire cabinet, for example-can be liable if
each individual is aware that he is exercising control, even jointly.44
The third element is the state or collective act of aggression. The
individual conduct set out in Element 1 (planning, preparation, initiating
or executing) causes the state act. The state act is a material element, not a
mental one. It is not individual conduct. The passive voice in the
statement, "[tihe act of aggression ... was committed," signals that
Element 3 is not a conduct element.45 The question, which remains
unresolved, is whether Element 3 is a consequence46 or circumstance
element.47 In a break with the pattern in the 2002 elements of the crimes,
the next element, Element 4, sets out the culpable mental state required for
Element 3. In this way, Element 4 renders moot the question of whether
Element 3 is a consequence48 or circumstance element.
41. See Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21.
42. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (element 2).
43. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 67.
44. Id.
45. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 69 (discussing the drafters' convention of using the active
voice only for the individual participant, with other sentences in the passive voice).
46. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 30(2)(b).
47. Id. art. 30(3).
48. Id. art. 30(2)(b).
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What Element 3 does resolve is the question of whether the state act
needs to be perfected (must have actually occurred) for liability to attach
to a leader who planned, prepared, initiated, or executed an act of
aggression. The Montreux group agreed that culpable individual conduct
committed purposefully will only result in liability if the state act of
aggression actually occurs. 4 9 There will be no liability for an attempted
crime of aggression that fails. 0 Nonetheless, an armed attack can arguably
exist at the moment it is launched, when the attack is completed, or
somewhere in between. This means that the smoking gun in Element 3, in
the unforgettable words of Condoleezza Rice, does not need to be a
mushroom cloud.
Element 4 is the most intricate, and perhaps also the most impervious,
of them all. It establishes that the mental state required for the
state/collective act (Element 3), is knowledge. The difficult question is,
knowledge of what, exactly? That a missile was fired? That it was fired
across a border? That it was fired across a border without first obtaining a
Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter? Or that
the Security Council explicitly warned against the use of military force in
this dispute, and a missile was fired across a border anyway? The
Montreux group wrestled with how much knowledge to require of a
perpetrator before Element 3 is satisfied and how to avoid the legal
problems inherent in a requirement to prove knowledge of law.53
However, it follows from the criminal law that knowledge of fact, if left
unchecked, forthwith fades into knowledge of law.54
Under Element 4, the perpetrator needs to know about the "factual
circumstances" that establish that such a use of armed force is
49. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 69.
50. Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, Int'l Crim. Ct., at 9-10, paras. 39-50, June 8-11, 2006, Doc. ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/
INF.1 (Sept. 5. 2006). available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/ SWGCA/ICC-ASP-5-
SWGCA-INFI English.pdf.
51. See Top Bush Officials Push Case Against Saddam, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002), http:/articles cnn
.com/2002-09-08/politics/iraq.debate_1_nuclear-weapons-top-nuclear-scientists-aluminum-tubes?_s=
PM:ALLPOLITICS (quoting Condoleeza Rice, acknowledging that uncertainty lies in knowing how
close an opponent is to possessing the capability to launch a nuclear attack, nevertheless advocating a
preemptive position and stating "[w]e don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.").
52. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 5 (element 4).
53. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 71.
54. See Clark, supra note 15, at 309-10 (Even in domestic legal systems, "where the lines lie
between fact and law is often hard to discern. . . . It is no defence to bigamy to claim a belief that
polygamy is lawful, but there is a defence for the actor who believes that the previous marriage
had terminated in divorce, even where this involves some mistake as to the laws of divorce.") (footnote
omitted).
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inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The special
introduction to the Elements narrows the meaning of Element 4 somewhat
by making it clear that no legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed
force is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations is necessary to
establish knowledge.5 5 The participants at Montreux were concerned that
leaders would deliberately avoid requesting legal advice pertaining to the
use of force or remain willfully blind to it in order to insulate themselves
from legal accountability.56 In domestic criminal law, willful blindness,
"cutting off of one's normal curiosity by effort of the will," is a standard
culpable mental state.5  The U.S. experience with the so-called torture
memos, where political pressure skewed the content of supposedly
objective legal advice, was also fresh on the participants' minds.
The SWGCA Chairman, in his 2009 Non-paper on the Elements of
Crimes, trims some more uncertainty at the other end of the knowledge
spectrum when he writes:
To satisfy proposed Element 4, it would not be sufficient merely to
show that the perpetrator knew of facts indicating that the State used
armed force. It would also be necessary to show that the perpetrator
knew of facts establishing the inconsistency of the use of force with
the Charter of the United Nations.59
The Chairman's examples of relevant facts that the defendant must know
about to satisfy Element 4 can be characterized as brackish, or semi-
legal:60 "the fact that the use of force was directed against another State,
the existence or absence of a Security Council resolution, the content of a
Security Council resolution, the existence or absence of a prior or
imminent attack by another state."
55. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, Intro., at21, para. 2.
56. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 71; see also 2009 Chairman's Non-Paper on the Elements of
Crimes, in CRIME OF AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION 677, 682, para. 18 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kre8 eds., 2012) (discussing how a
perpetrator may actively avoid legal advice, as well as rely on disreputable advice about the legality of
State acts).
57. Shawn D. Rodriguez, Caging Careless Birds: Examining Dangers Posed by the Willful
Blindness Doctrine in the War on Terror, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 691, 718 (2008) (quoting United States
v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006)).
58. Neil A. Lewis, A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com
/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html? r-0 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
59. 2009 Chairman 's Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 20.
60. The same phenomenon of brackish legal-factual knowledge arises in relation to certain war
crimes and crimes against humanity. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 7(1)(d) (elements 2-3), art.
8(2)(a)(i) (elements 2-3).
61. 2009 Chairman 's Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 20.
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The knowledge requirement in Element 4 becomes even subtler when it
is read in conjunction with Article 32(2) of the Rome Statute, the section
providing a mistake of law defense.62 Under Article 32(2), a mistake of
law may be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the
mental element of a crime. In his 2001 article on the mental element in
international criminal law, Roger Clark contributed a helpful rule of
thumb: the mistake of law defense that "'works' is normally a mistake
about some law which is collateral to the central criminal proscription
.... ."64 Arguably, a mistake about the existence of a Security Council
resolution authorizing the use of armed force, at least one that is analogous
to the bigamist's mistake of law defense that his prior marriage had been
legally terminated in divorce, would fit the bill.
Yet, as the chairman rightly notes in his 2009 Non-paper on the
Elements of Crimes, requiring knowledge of factual circumstances, as
Element 4 does, may limit the availability of mistake of law defenses.6 A
leader who fired a missile in response to an imminent attack, a legal grey
area in international law, is precluded from claiming mistake of law if
simple knowledge that his state's missile was fired across a neighbor's
border is enough to establish the culpable mental state for Element 4. As
Clark points out, limiting the scope of mistake of law defenses in this way
could possibly be found by the Court to violate the Rome Statute: 6 6 "The
Court itself has the ultimate word on whether creative elements such as
these are consistent with the Statute."67
Anggadi, French, and Potter seem satisfied that Elements 5 and 6
resolve the problem of identifying the culpable mental state of the
perpetrator of the crime of aggression when it comes to the state/collective
act.68 Element 5 is a material element requiring that the state act of
aggression, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitute a "manifest"
violation of the UN Charter. 69 Element 6, the mental element that goes
with Article 5, requires that the perpetrator knows of the factual
circumstances amounting to a "manifest" violation of the UN Charter. 0
62. See Clark, supra note 15, at 308-12, for a revealing commentary on Article 32 of the Rome
Statute.
63. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 32(2).
64. Clark, supra note 15, at 310 (quotation marks in original).
65. 2009 Chairman 's Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 21.
66. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 9(3).
67. Clark, supra note 17, at 1112.
68. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 75-76.
69. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (element 5).
70. Id. (element 6).
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Anggadi, French, and Potter's point is that arguing mistake of law is
difficult for a defendant to do when he is involved in a manifest violation
of the UN Charter.7 The complication, however, is that establishing the
defendant knew that a manifest violation of the UN Charter took place
seems to require proving that the defendant had some knowledge of the
law of the Charter, not just factual circumstances-the requirement in
Elements 4 and 6.n
The special introduction to the Elements of the Crime of Aggression7 3
explains that "manifest" is an objective determination and therefore up to
the Court to establish by considering what a reasonable leader should
know.74 The challenge in Montreux was to imagine a scenario where a
state committed an act of aggression that a leader could reasonably believe
did not amount to a manifest violation of the UN Charter. The scenario
envisaged by the participants at Montreux was a leader who planned, and
therefore had knowledge of, a small-scale border skirmish that got out of
control and, unbeknownst to him, resulted in a large-scale invasion of a
neighboring state (a manifest violation of the UN Charter).7 The
Montreux group acknowledged that the leader in a scenario like this,
arguably, should not be subject to criminal liability.76 If the Court finds
that a reasonable leader would not have known that the act of aggression
would be a manifest violation of the UN Charter, he would be absolved of
77individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. A more
troubling scenario will arise when a leader deploys armed force in what
she, in good faith, thinks is self-defense or justified humanitarian
intervention, and the Court finds that it is, objectively, a manifest violation
of the UN Charter. Though ignorance of the law is never an excuse in
domestic criminal law regimes, an "honest and reasonable" mistake often
is.7 Under the elements, the Court will be expected, on a case-by-case
basis, to distinguish between objectively reasonable defensive or
humanitarian actions and manifestly illegal ones.
71. See Anggadi et al., supra note 19.
72. The special introduction to the elements explains, lt]here is no requirement to prove that the
perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to the 'manifest' nature of the violation of the Charter of the
United Nations," but it is hard to imagine how the defendant can know that the state act is a manifest
violation without some knowledge of the law of the Charter. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex
II, Special Introduction, at 21, para 4.
73. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, Special Introduction, at 21, para. 3.
74. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, Special Introduction, at 21, para. 3-4.
75. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 76.
76. Id.
77. State responsibility for a violation of the UN Charter may still exist as a possible recourse.
78. See Clark, supra note 15, at 308-09.
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In most legal systems in the world, a court in a criminal case can
impute knowledge. 79 Absent honest disclosure, it is simply not possible to
get at the internal mental state of a defendant without inferring it from
external cues. The statement of this principle in Illinois criminal law, for
example, is found in the case of People v. Conley: "[i]ntent can be inferred
from the surrounding circumstances." 0 The ordinary presumption, writes
Professor Joshua Dressier in his discussion of Conley, "is that a person
'intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions."'81 Words,
actions, the minutes of meetings attended, the armaments used in an
attack, and other factors that shed light on the mental state of the defendant
as he commits the material elements of the crime are all relevant. It
follows that knowledge, as required in Elements 2, 4, and 6 of the crime of
aggression, will be inferred from surrounding circumstances as well.
III. MENS REA DEFENSES
Mens rea is an important, even central, consideration when judging
whether a defendant has satisfied all of the elements of the crime of
aggression. There are different ways that mens rea can come into play in
an aggression case. When the defendant successfully demonstrates that the
prosecution has not satisfied one or more of the elements of the crime, it
can be said that the defendant has mounted a successful "failure of proof'
defense. It is a failure of proof defense to show, for example, that a
leader-defendant was not aware of the factual circumstances that
establish that the use of armed force by his military was inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations. In such a case, Element 4 is not proven.
The exculpatory defenses of justification and excuse may also arise in
aggression cases. Justification and excuse defenses can succeed even
when the prosecution establishes all of the elements of the crime. 84 There
is a rich literature that tries to capture the essence of these defenses and
79. See generally Shane Darcy, Imputed Criminal Liability and the Goals of International
Justice, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 377, 380 (2007).
80. People v. Conley, 543 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ill. App. Ct 1989).
81. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 156 (5th ed. 2009).
82. Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
203-05 (1982).
83. See Clark, supra note 15, at 318-19.
84. See, e.g., id; Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts
and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1155, 1171 (1987); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 207 (6th ed. 2012) ("[t]oday, justified and excused actors are ... acquitted of the
offense and neither is punished for her conduct"); Transcript of Judge's Order, People v. Lagrou, No.
85-000098 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Mar. 22, 1985).
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their distinguishing features.85 According to Joshua Dressler, "[Ln its
simplest form . . . justified conduct is conduct that is 'a good thing, or the
right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do.'" 86 The defendant
causes a legally recognized harm but, as Paul Robinson explains, "that
harm is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further
a greater societal interest."8 "Whereas a justification negates the social
harm of an offense," writes Dressler, "an excuse negates the moral
blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm."88 Robinson posits that
the deed may be wrong, but the actor is not responsible for his deed and
should therefore be excused.8 9
A number of defenses are contained in Part 3 of the Rome Statute, the
general section applicable to all ICC crimes. The excuses of insanity, 90
intoxication,9 duress,9 and superior orders (narrowly conceived)93 are all
specifically set out in Part 3. Mistake of fact and law, which usually
qualify as failure of proof defenses that vitiate the mens rea element of the
crime, are also included. 9 4 Self-defense and defense of others, familiar
justification defenses in most criminal law jurisdictions, make an
appearance in Part 3 of the Rome Statute as well. 5  Perhaps most
significantly, the Court may consider other grounds for excluding criminal
responsibility that are not explicitly included in the Rome Statute. 96 It is
either here, in Article 31(3), and/or in Article 22 on nullum crimen sine
lege9' that Michael Glennon's legality challenge may one day be leveled. 98
Not all of these are mens rea defenses. Most excuses vitiate the actus
reus of the crime.99 Bentham's view is that excuses exclude punishment
for "conduct [that] is nondeterrable," lest the law cause "unnecessary
85. See Dressler, supra note 84, at 1155.
86. Id. at 1161.
87. Robinson, supra note 82, at 213.
88. Dressler, supra note 84, at 1163.
89. Robinson, supra note 82, at 221.
90. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(a).
91. Id. art. 31(1)(b).
92. Id. art. 31(1)(d).
93. Id. art. 33.
94. Id. art. 32.
95. Id. art. 31(1)(c).
96. Id. art. 31(3).
97. "No crime without law." This principle, like the principle of legality or nonretroactivity,
stands for the idea that an individual can only be held responsible for acts that were illegal at the time
of their commission. See, e.g., Rehan Abeyratne, Superior Responsibility and the Principle of Legality
at the ECCC, 44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 39, 41 (2012).
98. See Michael Glennon, The Blank Prose Crime ofAggression, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 71 (2010).
99. They vitiate both the actus reus and the mens rea.
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evil."100 According to H.L.A. Hart, excuses limit liability to people who
have freely chosen to act. 101 Under either theoretical explanation, people
who commit crimes-including the crime of aggression-while not in
their right mind, can raise an exculpatory excuse defense. Insanity,102
intoxication,103 superior orders, 104 and duress that impedes free choice,
unlike situations involving a choice of evils, all overcome the will.
Consequently, crimes committed in this state cannot be deterred.10 These
defenses are, consequently, outside the scope of this mens rea discussion.
Self-defense,10 6 defense of others,107 and duress that involves a choice
of evils (rather than duress impeding free choice)'" are all justification
defenses that may one day be raised in an aggression case. Dressler
explains, "[a] justified act is one that 'the law does not condemn, or even
welcomes.'"i 0 Paul Robinson states, "[a]ll justification defenses have the
same internal structure: triggering conditions permit a necessary and
proportional response."110 Justification defenses pertain specifically to
mens rea because, unlike most excuse defenses, the defendant has made a
meaningful choice. In the context of an aggression case, self-defense and
defense of others are relevant in two of the most important grey-area
scenarios: anticipatory self-defense in response to an imminent attack and
humanitarian intervention.
Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, on self-defense and the defense of
others, is reproduced here in relevant part:'''
100. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
160-62 (J. Bums & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1970), quoted in Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 257, 263 (1987).
101. H. L. A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 46-49 (2008).
102. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(a).
103. Id. art. 31(1)(b) ("unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such
circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or
she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court").
104. Id. art. 33; Clark, supra note 17, at 1110 (calls Article 33 of the Rome Statute "a very badly
drafted provision which permits a defence of superior orders in some cases, perhaps only in the case of
war crimes."). Clark refers to Otto Triffterer, Article 33, Superior Orders and Prescription of Law, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE By ARTICLE 915 (2d ed. 2008).
105. It should, however, be noted that behavior that placed the defendant in the mentally or
morally compromised situation (i.e., voluntarily induced intoxication) can sometimes be deterred.
106. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(c).
107. Id. art. 31(1)(c).
108. Id. art. 31(1)(d).
109. DRESSLER, supra note 84, at 208.
110. Robinson, supra note 82, at 216 (emphasis in original).
Ill. This excludes the language that is specific to war crimes.
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The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another
person ... against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a
manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person. . . . The
fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted
by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding
112
criminal responsibility under this subparagraph ....
This provision raises a number of legal questions that concern the
minimum triggering conditions to activate the defense, the imminence of
the threat (the necessity criterion), the unlawfulness of the threat, and the
proportionality of the defensive response. The key mens rea question
involved, however, pertains to the reasonableness requirement' 13 and how
far the Court should go in taking the defendant's specific predicament and
characteristics into account in its judgment. In other words, is the
"reasonable person" a purely objective or a mixed standard in Article
3 1(1)(c)?
In the U.S. case of State v. Leidholm, for example, the court announced
this mixed reasonableness standard when evaluating a self-defense claim:
"an accused's actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a
[reasonable] person whose mental and physical characteristics are like the
accused's and who sees what the accused sees and knows what the
accused knows."1 4 This mixed reasonableness standard can be contrasted
with a purely objective standard that evaluates the defendant's mental state
against the ideal of the reasonable person, remaining deliberately blind to
context, the knowledge possessed by the defendant, and his personal
characteristics.' 15 The Leidholm standard can also be contrasted with a
subjective standard that takes the defendant's actual context, knowledge,
and personal characteristics into account when determining the
applicability of Article 3 1(1)(c) defenses.
There has been a tendency in the criminal law, at least when it comes
to women who kill their abusive husbands, to move toward an increasingly
subjective-looking mixed standard in self-defense claims.' 16 The Canadian
112. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(c).
113. Presumably an honesty requirement will be read into Article 31(1)(c). For self-defense to
succeed in national jurisdictions, the defendant must have acted in an "honest and reasonable" belief
that the threat was imminent. See Clark, supra note 15, at 308-09 (discussing the inclusion of an
honesty and reasonableness of mistake requirement in the ICC negotiations).
114. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1983).
115. Id. at 816-17.
116. See, e.g., R v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 6-10
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that evidence of battered woman's syndrome is relevant to the
reasonableness and subjective existence of a battered woman's need to defend herself against her
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case of R. v. Lavallee is representative. 17 Lavallee shot her abusive
partner in the back of the head as he walked away and claimed that she
feared for her life and saw no other alternative. Even though the threat did
not meet the traditional imminence threshold, Lavallee was acquitted
because, for a person suffering from battered woman's syndrome, it was
reasonable, in light of the pattern of interactions between her and the
deceased, to perceive the threat as imminent and to see no other escape.
The idea gained some traction in the international law literature and
culminated in a discussion of "battered nation syndrome."' 18 In spite of the
indelicate catchphrase title, this idea is likely to have an influence on the
interpretation of the Kampala Outcome if and when the perception of
imminence becomes a legal issue. It remains to be seen whether the Court
hearing an aggression case will adopt an objective or a mixed standard
when faced with a self-defense or defense of others claim.
Like self-defense and defense of others, duress becomes a mens rea
issue when the defendant claiming it has deliberately chosen to cause the
prohibited social harm."' 9 When distinguishing self-defense and defense of
others (Article 31(1)(c) defenses) from duress (an Article 31(1)(d)
defense), one might imagine that a villain is holding a gun to the head of
the leader or his child and threatening to shoot unless that leader gives the
order to launch a missile at another state. Like self-defense and defense of
others, duress can only succeed as a defense if the threat is imminent.120
Presumably, the question of the appropriate reasonableness standard,
objective, or mixed that arises in 3 1(1)(c) will also surface in duress cases.
The threat should not have to be caused by another person. Many domestic
jurisdictions extend the defense to situations of necessity, where a threat is
caused by natural, rather than man-made, circumstances. A leader who
orders an invasion of another state to rescue his citizens from a
culminating tsunami that only his oceanographers are aware of should be
able to raise a defense.
abusive husband); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10-13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (applying Oklahoma's
"hybrid" subjective and objective standard in a battered woman syndrome murder prosecution).
117. See generally Lavallee, I S.C.R. at 852.
118. See Michael Skopets, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of
Self-Defense in International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (2006); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 215-16 (2004); Shana
Wallace, Comment, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered Women 's Right to
Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2004).
119. Duress is an actus reus issue when it vitiates the will and the defendant acts automatically,
because such a defendant lacks the volition to act. See, e.g., State v. Utter, 479 P.2d 946, 947-48
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
120. DRESSLER, supra note 84, at 298.
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An important mens rea criterion that the Court faced with a duress
defense will need to consider, one that does not arise in self-defense and
defense of other cases, is whether the defendant "intend[ed] to cause a
greater harm than the one sought to be avoided."' 2' The proportionality
criteria in self-defense and defense of other cases is similar, but not
exactly the same. In duress cases, for example, the prosecution will need
to prove that the defendant intended to cause a greater harm and, therefore,
knew that it was a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. 122
Presumably the duress defense would have failed in the 2006 case of Gilad
Shalit, the Israeli soldier captured by Hamas, who Israel launched a large-
scale armed conflict, in part, to free. 123 The duress defense might have
succeeded, however, following the 1986 Entebbe Airport raid, conducted
by Israel to free over one hundred Israeli and Jewish passengers from a
hijacked Air France plane when Ugandan leader Idi Amin refused to
act. 124 In the Entebbe raid, the harm caused-a geographically narrow and
time-limited invasion and the deaths of the hijackers-was calculated to
be less than the one sought to be avoided, the death of many passengers.
This is unlike the return of Gilad Shalit, which involved large-scale armed
conflict, was not geographically narrow or time limited, and advanced
other strategic goals beyond the eventual return of Shalit. 125
According to Roger Clark, "[i]t is, for example, here [Article 31(1)(d)]
that arguments about the legality of humanitarian intervention may need to
be structured."126 The leader caused the social harm-the invasion of
another state-but it was necessary to prevent a larger harm: a large-scale
humanitarian disaster. The act of aggression was therefore justified and
can succeed as a complete exculpatory defense.
Thomas Franck, in Recourse to Force,127 makes a similar argument that
humanitarian intervention amounts to necessity but adds a creative
modification of potential use to the Court in an aggression case. 1 Franck
bases his reasoning on the nineteenth century lifeboat cases of The Queen
121. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(d).
122. Id.
123. See Orly Halpern, What the Gaza War Meant for Israel, ALJAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera
.com/focus/gazaoneyearon/2010/2010/01/201011392050370701.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2010).
124. BBC On This Day: 4 July 1976: Israelis Rescue Entebbe Hostages, BBC, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/newsid 2786000/2786967.stm (last visited Dec. 11,2012).
125. See Halpern, supra note 123.
126. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1110.
127. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE To FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 174-75 (2002).
128. Id.
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v. Dudley and Stephens1 29 and United States v. Holmes130 where
shipwrecked sailors killed and ate one of their crewmembers to survive at
sea. Article 31(1)(d) is a complete exculpatory defense to aggression and
the other ICC crimes. Yet, in these lifeboat cases, necessity did not
succeed as a complete exculpatory defense to murder. As Franck notes,
circumstances amounting to necessity "effectively mitigated the penalties
imposed on those whose acts were found to have been illegal but, in the
extreme circumstances, justifiable." " Ignoring for the moment the
theoretical problem of whether a legitimately justified act can actually be
illegal,13 Franck's mitigation of penalties theory amounts to a
supplementary or alternative defense alongside the exculpatory duress
defense set out in Article 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute and invoked by
Roger Clark in the context of humanitarian intervention.1
An interesting idiosyncrasy of the Kampala amendments is that the
self-defense and defense of others issues can surface at various stages of
the proceedings, not only when it comes to mens rea defenses. The
question of whether a particular state act amounts to aggression, self-
defense, or humanitarian rescue first becomes a central consideration as
early as the jurisdictional phase.13 4 The Court addresses the question again
when considering the substantive crime and, in particular, Element 3,
concerning the state act. This substantive determination is independent of
the determination for the purposes of jurisdiction and can even contradict
i.135it.
The questions of self-defense and/or humanitarian rescue will
conceivably arise again after the Court determines that aggression has
occurred. Pursuant to Elements 5 and 6, the Court must then evaluate
whether the act of aggression was a "manifest" violation of the UN
Charter. A particular use of force can, under the Kampala Outcome, be
illegal without amounting to a manifest violation of the UN Charter. The
paradigmatic examples are self-defense in response to an imminent attack
and genuine humanitarian rescue. But not even the substantive
determination that the state committed a manifest violation of the UN
129. R v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.).
130. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1842).
131. FRANCK, supra note 127, at 179.
132. See Dressler, supra note 84, at 1161 ("A justification . . . negates the social harm of an
offense.").
133. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1110.
134. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, at 19-20, arts. 15 bis, 15 ter.
135. Id. at 19, art. 15 bis, para. 9 ("A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the
Court shall be without prejudice to the Court's own findings under this Statute.").
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Charter puts the issue to rest. As discussed earlier, self-defense and
defense of others are also exculpatory defenses for a leader in the dock. A
judge hearing an aggression case, especially one adopting a mixed
reasonableness standard as discussed above, could find that the state
committed a manifest violation of the UN Charter, but the defendant-
leader who ordered the attack honestly and reasonably believed he was
acting in self-defense or to defend others (his people). Finally, a Court that
adopts Thomas Franck's mitigation of penalties theory might decide to
consider self-defense or defense of others issues at sentencing. Given this
range of options for the defense, a defense lawyer who is unable to figure
out where to fit his self-defense or humanitarian intervention argument
should get stronger spectacles.
Roger Clark thinks that it is extremely unlikely that the final
enumerated defense, the defense of superior orders contained in Article 33
of the Rome Statute, will ever work in an aggression case. Clark's
reasoning is that aggression is a leadership crime and is, by definition,
inapplicable to followers. 3 1 Certainly, it is difficult, though probably not
impossible, to imagine a situation where all three requirements of the
superior orders defense are met for a leader. For the defense to succeed,
the leader-defendant must fulfill the following criteria: be under a legal
obligation to obey the orders of his Government; not know that the order
was unlawful; and the order cannot be manifestly unlawful. 3 8 Even if it is
possible to imagine a scenario where a leader with sufficient authority to
satisfy Element 2 follows an order (I think it is, particularly in a
democracy), the requirement that there be no manifest unlawfulness
essentially guarantees that the leader will be acquitted on other grounds
(see the preceding paragraph) before the defendant has a chance to raise
the superior orders defense. The crime of aggression, recall, requires a
manifest violation of the UN Charter.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the most important mens rea question will be whether,
taken as a whole, the mental element satisfies our notions of culpability for
the wrong. Is the phenomenon defined in 2010 as the crime of aggression,
when scrutinized, sufficiently blameworthy to warrant serious stigma and
punishment?
136. Clark, supra note 17, at 1110.
137. Id.; Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (element 2).
138. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 33(1)(a-c).
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A number of zones within the mens rea structure of the crime of
aggression may pose a challenge to traditional notions of culpability. The
fact that a leader need not mean (have the purpose) to commit a state act of
aggression (knowledge will suffice)139 may trouble some who are
accustomed to criminal law systems which require intent of criminal
conduct before punishment will be imposed. The "knowledge of factual
circumstances" gloss in Elements 4 and 6 also challenges contemporary
notions of culpability in certain scenarios. 140 A leader who has knowledge
of a military operation but does not intend to violate the UN Charter can
still be punished under some circumstances.141 This creative mens rea
standard is especially troubling in grey-area scenarios where the exact
contours of international law on the use of force are in dispute. Three
important examples are self-defense in response to an imminent attack,
humanitarian rescue, and cyber-attacks.14 2 The fact that grey area scenarios
are excluded under the "manifest violation" qualifier offers some comfort.
However, "manifest violation" is an objective standard-a rarity in
domestic criminal law systems where incarceration or other serious
punishment is involved. If knowledge that a missile was fired across a
border is enough to satisfy Elements 4 and 6, a Court can simply reject a
leader's honest belief that his state's acts were defensive or humanitarian,
whatever proof he may offer. Furthermore, the "knowledge of factual
circumstances" gloss may preclude a mistake of law defense, offending
some criminal lawyers. 43
None of this necessarily crosses the line, even if some aspects of the
mens rea of the crime of aggression may push against it. Perhaps some
challenges to traditional criminal law doctrines are inevitable when
conceptualizing a new crime that attributes individual responsibility for a
large-scale collective act such as aggression. Certainly, the judges are
being asked to chart a new course. It will be up to them, hearing concrete
aggression cases and reasoning from existing jurisprudence, to keep the
mens rea elements within the bounds of contemporary criminal law and to
ensure that the fledgling crime accords with evolving notions of
culpability.
139. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (elements 3-4).
140. However, the fact that the "knowledge of factual circumstances" gloss exists in other parts of
the Rome Statute in relation to other crimes buttresses the use of this language somewhat.
141. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (elements 4, 6).
142. Noah Weisbord, Judging Aggression, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 82, 149-67 (2011).
143. This is so unless the Court accepts the SWGCA Chairman's interpretation of "knowledge of
factual circumstances." 2009 Chairman's Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 20.
